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Abstract
This paper offers an equilibrium existence theorem in discontinuous games. We introduce
a new notion of continuity, called quasi-weak transfer continuity that guarantees the existence
of pure strategy Nash equilibrium in compact and quasiconcave games. We also consider
possible extensions and improvements of the main result. Our conditions are simple and
easy to verify. We present applications to show that our conditions allow for economically
meaningful payoff discontinuities.
Keywords: Discontinuous games; quasi-weak transfer continuity; various notions of transfer
continuity; Nash equilibrium
1 Introduction
The concept of Nash equilibrium in Nash (1950, 1951) is probably the most important solution
concept in game theory. It is immune from unilateral deviations, that is, each player has no in-
centive to deviate from his/her strategy given that other players do not deviate from theirs. Nash
(1951) proved that a finite game has a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies. Debreu (1952) then
showed that games possess a pure strategy Nash equilibrium if (1) the strategy spaces are convex
and compact, and (2) players have continuous and quasiconcave payoff functions. However, in
many important economic models, such as those in Bertrand (1883), Hotelling (1929), Milgrom
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(1985), Dasgupta and Maskin (1986), and Jackson (2009), payoffs are particularly discontinuous
and/or non-quasiconcave.
Economists then seek weaker conditions that can guarantee the existence of equilibrium.
Some seek to weaken the quasiconcavity of payoffs or substitute it with some forms of transitiv-
ity/monotonicity of payoffs (cf. McManus (1964), Roberts and Sonnenschein (1977), Nishimura
and Friedman (1981), Topkis (1979), Vives (1990), and Milgrom and Roberts (1990)), some seek
to weaken the continuity of payoff functions (cf. Dasgupta and Maskin (1986), Simon (1987),
Simon and Zame (1990), Tian (1992a, 1992b, 1992c, 2009), Tian and Zhou (1992, 1995), Reny
(1999, 2009), Bagh and Jofre (2006), Morgan and Scalzo (2007), Carmona (2009, 2011), and
Nessah (2011)), while others seek to weaken both quasiconcavity and continuity (cf. Yao (1992),
Baye et al. (1993), Tian (2009), McLennan et al. (2011), Prokopovych (2011, 2013), Barelli and
Meneghel (2013), and Nessah and Tian (2009, 2013)).
This paper investigates the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria in discontinuous games.
We introduce a new notion of very weak continuity, called quasi-weak transfer continuity, which
holds in a large class of discontinuous games. Roughly speaking, a game is quasi-weakly transfer
continuous if for every nonequilibrium strategy x, there exists a player i, a neighborhood N and
a securing strategy profile such that for every deviation strategy profile z in N , agent i’s payoff at
securing strategy is strictly above the payoff at the local security level even if the others deviate
slightly from z.
We establish that a compact, convex, quasiconcave and quasi-weakly transfer continuous game
has a Nash equilibrium and show that it is unrelated to Reny (1999), Carmona (2009, 2011), Nes-
sah (2011), Prokopovych (2011, 2013), and Barelli and Meneghel (2013). We provide sufficient
conditions for quasi-weak transfer continuity such as weak transfer continuity, quasi-weak upper
semicontinuity and payoff security, and transfer lower continuity and quasi upper semicontinu-
ity. These conditions are satisfied in many economic games and are often simple to check. We
also provide the existence theorems for symmetric games, and consider further extensions and
improvements of our main result.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we first introduce the notion
of quasi-weak transfer continuity, and then provide the main existence result on pure strategy
Nash equilibrium. We also provide examples illustrating the theorems as well as some sufficient
conditions for quasi-weak transfer continuity. Section 3 considers the equilibrium existence for
symmetric games. Section 4 gives some possible extensions and improvements. Section 5 presents
some applications of interest to economists that illustrate the usefulness of our results. Section 6
concludes the paper. All the proofs are presented in the appendix.
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2 Existence of Nash Equilibria
Consider a game in normal form: G = (Xi; ui)i2I , where I = f1; :::; ng is a finite set of players,
Xi is player i’s strategy space that is a nonempty subset of a Hausdorff locally convex topological
vector space, and ui is player i’s payoff function from the set of strategy profilesX =
Q
i2I
Xi to R.
For each player i 2 I , denote by  i all players rather than player i. Also denote by X i =
Q
j 6=i
Xj
the set of strategies of the players in  i. Product sets are endowed with the product topology.
A game G = (Xi; ui)i2I is said to be compact if for all i 2 I , ui is bounded and Xi is
compact. A gameG = (Xi; ui)i2I is said to be quasiconcave if for every i 2 I ,Xi is convex and
the function ui is quasiconcave in xi. A pure strategy Nash equilibrium of G is a strategy profile
x 2 X such that ui(yi; x i)  ui(x) for yi 2 Xi and all i 2 I .
The following weak notion of continuity, quasi-weak transfer continuity, guarantees the exis-
tence of equilibrium in compact and quasiconcave games.
DEFINITION 2.1 A game G = (Xi; ui)i2I is said to be quasi-weakly transfer continuous if
whenever x 2 X is not an equilibrium, there exists a player i, yi 2 Xi,  > 0, and some
neighborhood Nx of x such that for every z 2 Nx and every neighborhood Nz  Nx of z,
ui(yi; z i) > ui(zi; z0 i) +  for some z
0 2 Nz .
Quasi-weak transfer continuity means that whenever x is not an equilibrium, some player i
has a strategy yi yielding a strictly large payoff at the local security level even if the others play
slightly differently than at x.1
We then have the following main result.
THEOREM 2.1 If G = (Xi; ui)i2I is compact, quasiconcave, and quasi-weakly transfer contin-
uous, then it possesses a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
The proof of the theorem will be presented in the appendix. We here briefly explain why quasi-
weak transfer continuity ensures the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium for compact and
quasiconcave games. When a game fails to have a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, by quasi-weak
transfer continuity, for every strategy profile x, some player i has a strategy yi yielding a strictly
large payoff at the local security level provided the others play slightly differently than at x. As
such, the difference of payoffs at deviation strategy profile (yi; x i) and disequilibrium strategy
x is uniformly positive. On the other hand, it can be shown that the resulting maximum value
function 	i of this difference is lower semicontinuous, and further, by quasiconcavity, the set
of deviation strategies yi that results in positive maximum value of the difference, i.e., the set
1The local security level at z means the value of the least favorable outcome in a neighborhood of z, given by
ui(z)  supNzN
inf
z02Nz
ui(zi; z
0
 i).
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defined by Ci(x) = fyi 2 Xi : 	i(x; yi) > 0g is convex for all x 2 X , and its inverse set
C 1i (yi) = fx 2 X : 	i(x; yi) > 0g is an open set for each of such yi. Then, by Yannelis and
Prabhakar Theorem, there exists a strategy profile x such that the maximum value of the function
is nonpositive at the deviation strategy yi, which is impossible.
Note that, contrary to the results of Reny (1999), Bagh and Jofre (2006), Carmona (2009,
2011), and Prokopovych (2011), which require verifying the closureness of the graph of the vector
payoff function, quasi-weak transfer continuity is relatively easier to verify, requiring no analysis
of any closures of high-dimensional objects.
EXAMPLE 2.1 Consider the following game with two players and the unit square X1 = X2 =
[0; 1]. For player i = 1; 2 and x = (x1; x2) 2 X = [0; 1]2, let the payoff functions for the players
be given by
ui(x1; x2) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
xi + 1; if x i > 12
1; if xi > 12 and x i =
1
2
 1; if xi  12 and x i = 12
xi   1; if x i < 12 :
It can be verified that the game is not (generalized) better-reply secure so that Proposition 2.4
of Barelli and Meneghel (2013), Theorem 1 of Carmona (2011) and Theorem 3.1 in Reny (1999)
cannot be applied. It is not generalized weakly transfer continuous so that Theorem 3.1 of Nessah
(2011) cannot be used. It is neither weakly reciprocal upper semicontinuous. As such, Theorem 4
in Prokopovych (2011) and Corollary 2 in Carmona (2009) cannot be applied.
However, it is quasi-weakly transfer continuous. Indeed, let x = (x1; x2) be a nonequilibrium
strategy profile. If (x1; x2) 6= (12 ; 12), then by nonequilibrium of x and continuity of payoffs at x,
there exists a player i, yi 2 Xi,  > 0, and some neighborhoodN of x such that for all z 2 N , we
have ui(yi; z i)   supNzN
inf
z02Nz
ui(zi; z
0
 i) > . Since x1 = x2 =
1
2 , for i = 1, sufficiently small
 > 0, neighborhood N  (12   ; 12 + )2 of (12 ; 12), and yi = 1, we have
Case 1) If z i > 12 , then for every neighborhood Nz of z, there is z0 2 Nz so that z0 i = z i > 12
and ui(yi; z i) = 2 > 1 + zi +  = ui(zi; z0 i) + .
Case 2) If z i < 12 , then for every neighborhood Nz of z, there is z0 2 Nz so that z0 i = z i < 12
and ui(yi; z i) = 0 > zi   1 +  = ui(zi; z0 i) + .
Case 3) If z i = 12 , then for every neighborhood Nz of z, there is z0 2 Nz so that z0 i < 12 and
ui(yi; z i) = 1 > zi   1 +  = ui(zi; z0 i) + .
Since the game is compact and quasiconcave, by Theorem 2.1, it possesses a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium.
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Prokopovych (2013) introduced the notion of weak single deviation property that general-
izes better-reply security of Reny (1999), weak transfer quasi-continuity of Nessah and Tian
(2009) and single deviation property of Reny (2009) as follows: A game G = (Xi; ui)i2I has
the weak single deviation property if whenever x 2 X is not an equilibrium, there exists an
open neighborhood N of x, a set of players I(x)  I and a collection of deviation strategies
fyi(x) 2 Xi : i 2 I(x)g such that for every z 2 N nonequilibrium, there exists a player
j 2 I(x) satisfying uj(yj(x); z j) > uj(z). He then provided a theorem (Theorem 2) that shows
under the weak single deviation property and a condition (Condition (ii) in Theorem 2), there is
a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in games with compact and convex strategy spaces. Notice that
Condition (ii) is unrelated to quasiconcavity. Indeed, Reny (2009) constructed a counterexample
where the game G = (Xi; ui)i2I is compact, quasiconcave, and has the single deviation property
which implies weak single deviation property, but it may not possess a pure strategy Nash equilib-
rium (also see Example 2 in Prokopovych (2013)). Moreover, the following example shows that
quasi-weak transfer continuity does not imply the weak single deviation property either. As such,
Theorem 2.1 is unrelated to Theorem 2 in Prokopovych (2013).
EXAMPLE 2.2 Consider the following concession game with two players and the unit square
X1 = X2 = [0; 1]. For player i = 1; 2 and x = (x1; x2) 2 X = [0; 1]2, let the payoff functions
for the players be given by
ui(x1; x2) =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
1; if xi = 0 and x i > 0
x i   xi + 1; if xi < x i and xi > 0
3xi; if xi = x i < 12
0; if xi = x i  12
x i   xi   1; if xi > x i:
It can be verified that the game does not have the weak single deviation property. Indeed,
let x = (12 ;
1
2) be a nonequilibrium. For an open neighborhood N of (12 ; 12), a set of players
I(12 ;
1
2)  I and a collection of deviation strategies fyi(x) 2 Xi : i 2 I(x)g, we can find a
nonequilibrium strategy z in N so that uj(yj(x); z j)  uj(z), for each j 2 I(x). To see this,
consider two cases:
(1) If I(12 ;
1
2) = figwhere i = 1; 2. Let z 2 N so that zi = z i = t 6= yi, t < 12 and t > 12  yi2
if yi > 0. Then
ui(yi; z i) =
8>><>>:
1; if yi = 0
t  yi + 1; if yi < t and yi > 0
t  yi   1; if yi > t:
 3t = ui(z):
5
(2) If I(12 ;
1
2) = I = f1; 2g. Let z 2 N so that zi = z i = t 6= yi, for each i = 1; 2, t < 12 and
t > 12   yi2 if yi > 0, for each i = 1; 2. Therefore, uj(z) = 3t for each j = 1; 2.
(i) If y1 = y2 = 0, then uj(yj ; z j) = 1 < 3t = uj(z), for each j = 1; 2.
(ii) If yi = 0 and y i > 0 for each i = 1; 2, then ui(yi; z i) = 1 < 3t = ui(z) and
u i(y i; zi) =
(
t  y i + 1; if y i < t
t  y i   1; if y i > t:
 3t = u i(z):
(iii) If y1 > 0 and y2 > 0, then for each j = 1; 2 we have
uj(yj ; z j) =
(
t  yj + 1; if yj < t
t  yj   1; if yj > t:
 3t = uj(z):
However, it is quasi-weakly transfer continuous. Indeed, x 6= (12 ; 12) is obviously quasi-weakly
transfer continuous. Suppose that x = (12 ;
1
2). Let  > 0 be sufficiently small,N  (12 ; 12+)2
and yi = , for some i = 1; 2. For each z 2 N , we have the following three cases:
(1) If zi < z i, then for every neighborhood Nz of z, there is z0 2 Nz so that z0 i > z i > zi
and ui(yi; z i) = 1 + z i    > 1 + z0 i   zi +  = ui(zi; z0 i) + .
(2) If zi > z i, then for every neighborhood Nz of z, there is z0 2 Nz so that z0 i < z i < zi
and ui(yi; z i) = 1 + z i    > z0 i   zi   1 +  = ui(zi; z0 i) + .
(3) If zi = z i, then for every neighborhood Nz of z, there is z0 2 Nz so that z0 i < zi and
ui(yi; z i) = 1 + z i    > z0 i   zi   1 +  = ui(zi; z0 i) + .
While it is somewhat simple to verify quasi-weak transfer continuity, it is sometimes even
simpler to verify other conditions leading to it.
DEFINITION 2.2 A game G = (Xi; ui)i2I is said to be weakly transfer continuous if whenever
x 2 X is not an equilibrium, there exists a player i, yi 2 Xi,  > 0, and some neighborhood Nx
of x such that ui(yi; x0 i) > ui(x
0) +  for all x0 2 Nx.
DEFINITION 2.3 A game G = (Xi; ui)i2I is said to be quasi upper semicontinuous (QUSC) if
for all i 2 I , x 2 X , and  > 0, there exists a neighborhood N of x such that for every z 2 N
and every neighborhood Nz  N of z, ui(x)  ui(zi; z0 i)   for some z0 2 Nz .
DEFINITION 2.4 A game G = (Xi; ui)i2I is said to be quasi-weakly upper semicontinuous
(QWUSC) if whenever x 2 X is not an equilibrium, there exists a player i, x^i 2 Xi,  > 0, and
some neighborhood Nx of x such that for every z 2 Nx and every neighborhood Nz  Nx of z,
ui(x^i; x i) > ui(zi; z0 i) +  for some z
0 2 Nz .
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DEFINITION 2.5 A game G = (Xi; ui)i2I is said to be weakly transfer lower semicontinuous
(WTLSC) if whenever x is not a Nash equilibrium, there exists a player i, yi 2 Xi,  > 0 and
some neighborhood Nx of x such that ui(yi; z i) > ui(x) +  for all z 2 Nx.
Weak transfer continuity was independently introduced in our previously circulated Nes-
sah and Tian (2008), which is the same as the single player deviation property introduced in
Prokopovych (2013). It is obvious that (1) weak transfer continuity implies quasi-weak transfer
continuity, (2) upper semicontinuity implies quasi upper semicontinuity, which in turn implies
quasi-weak upper semicontinuity, and (3) lower semicontinuity implies payoff security, which
in turn implies weak transfer lower semicontinuity. Also, quasi-weak upper semicontinuity and
transfer lower semicontinuity, when combined with payoff security2 and quasi upper semiconti-
nuity respectively, imply quasi-weak transfer continuity. We then have the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 2.1 Suppose that a game G satisfies any of the following conditions:
(a) it is weakly transfer continuous;
(b) it is quasi-weakly upper semicontinuous and payoff secure;
(c) it is weakly transfer lower semicontinuous and quasi upper semicontinuous.
Then it is quasi-weakly transfer continuous, and consequently, there exists a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium provided that it is also compact and quasiconcave.
EXAMPLE 2.3 Consider the two-player game with the following payoff functions defined on
[0; 1] [0; 1] :
ui(x1; x2) =
(
xi + 1 if x i > 12
xi   1 if x i  12 :
This game is not (generalized) better-reply secure nor (weakly) reciprocal upper semicontinuous.
As such, Corollary 3.3, Corollary 3.4 of Reny (1999), Proposition 1 of Bagh and Jofre (2006), and
Theorem 4 in Prokopovych (2011) cannot be applied.
However, the game is payoff secure and quasi-weakly upper semicontinuous. To see this, let
i 2 I ,  > 0, and x 2 X . If x i 6= 12 , then it is clear that there exists a strategy yi = 1 and some
neighborhood V of x i such that ui(yi; z i)  ui(x)   for each z i 2 V . If x i = 12 , then there
exists a strategy yi = 1 and some neighborhood V of x i such that ui(x)   = xi   1    0 
ui(yi; z i) for each z i 2 V . Thus, the game is payoff secure.
Also, let x = (x1; x2) be a nonequilibrium strategy profile. Then there exists a player i such
that xi < 1. Let xi+2 < 1 for some  > 0. If x i 6= 12 , then it is clear that there exists a strategy
2A game is payoff secure if for every x 2 X , every  > 0, and every player i, respectively, there exists xi 2 Xi
such that ui(xi; z i)  ui(x)   for all z i in some open neighborhood of x i.
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yi = 1 and some neighborhood V  (xi   ; xi + )  [0; 1] of x such that for every z 2 V and
every neighborhood Vz of z, ui(yi; x i) > ui(zi; z0 i) +  for some z0 2 Vz . If x i = 12 , then
there exists a strategy yi = 1 and some neighborhood V  (xi   ; xi + )  [0; 1] of x such
that for each z 2 V and every neighborhood Vz of z, there exists z0 2 Vz with z0 i = 12 so that
ui(zi; z
0
 i) +  = zi   1 +   xi + 2   1 < ui(yi; x i) = 0. Thus, it is quasi-weakly upper
semicontinuous. Since the game is also compact and quasiconcave, then by Proposition 2.1.(b), it
possesses a Nash equilibrium.
EXAMPLE 2.4 Consider the two-player game with the following payoff functions defined on
[ 1; 1] [ 1; 1] by
ui(x1; x2) =
8>><>>:
xi + 1 if x i > 0
xi if x i = 0
xi   12 if x i < 0:
This game is not generalized better-reply secure. However, it is clearly weakly transfer lower
continuous. To see that it is also quasi upper semicontinuous, consider a player i, a strategy x
and  > 0. If x i 6= 0, it is obvious that the game is quasi upper semicontinuous. If x i = 0,
then there exists a neighborhood N  (xi   ; xi + ]  ( ; ) of x (with  < 12 ) such that
for each z 2 N and each Nz as a neighborhood of z, there exists z0 2 Nz with z0 i < 0 so as
ui(x) = xi  (xi+)  12   ui(zi; z0 i) , which means it is also quasi upper semicontinuous
at x i = 0. Since the game is also compact and quasiconcave, then by Proposition 2.1.(c), it
possesses a Nash equilibrium.
3 Pure Strategy Symmetric Nash Equilibrium
In this section, it is assumed that G = (Xi; ui)i2I is a quasi-symmetric game, i.e., Z = X1 =
::: = Xn and u1(x; y; :::; y) = u2(y; x; y; :::; y) = un(y; :::; y; x) for all x; y 2 Z. Recall that a
Nash equilibrium (x1; :::; xn) is symmetric if x1 = x2 = ::: = xn.
DEFINITION 3.1 A symmetric game G = (Xi; ui)i2I is said to be diagonally quasi-weak trans-
fer continuous if whenever (x; :::; x) 2 Xn is not an equilibrium, there exists a player i, strategy
y 2 X ,  > 0, and neighborhood N of x such that for all z1; z2 2 N and every neighborhood
N(z1;z2)  N that contains z1 and z2, ui(z1; :::z1; y; z1; :::; z1) > ui(z0; :::; z0; z2; z0; :::; z0) + 
for some z0 2 N(z1;z2).
We then have the following existence theorem for quasi-symmetric games.
THEOREM 3.1 Suppose that G = (Xi; ui)i2I is quasi-symmetric, compact, quasiconcave, and
diagonally quasi-weak transfer continuous. Then it has a symmetric pure strategy Nash equilib-
rium.
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The following example illustrates Theorem 3.1.
EXAMPLE 3.1 Consider a timing game between two players on the unit squareX1 = X2 = [0; 1]
studied by Prokopovych (2013). For player i = 1; 2 and x = (x1; x2) 2 X = [0; 1]2, let the payoff
functions for the players be given by
ui(x1; x2) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
2; if xi < x i
2; if xi = x i < 12
0; if xi = x i  12
 2; if xi > x i:
It can be verified that the game is not diagonally better-reply secure so that Theorem 4.1 in
Reny (1999) cannot be applied. This game is not generalized weakly transfer continuous nor
weakly reciprocal upper semicontinuous so that the results in Nessah (2011), Prokopovych (2011)
and Carmona (2009) cannot be applied.
However, it is diagonally quasi-weak transfer continuous. Indeed, let (x; x) be a nonequilib-
rium strategy profile. By nonequilibrium of (x; x), we have 12  x  1. Then, there exists a player
i = 1,  = 1, some neighborhoodN  (; 1) of x and y = 0 such that for all z1; z2 2 N , we have
ui(y; z
1) = 2. For each neighborhoodN(z1;z2) that contains z1 and z2, there exists a z0 2 N(z1;z2)
with z0 < z2 such that ui(z2; z0) =  2. Thus ui(y; z1)   sup
N(z1;z2)N
inf
z02N(z1;z2)
ui(z
2; z0)  
for all z1; z2 2 N . Since the game is also quasi-symmetric, compact and quasiconcave, by Theo-
rem 3.1, it possesses a symmetric Nash equilibrium.
Quasiconcavity is still a strong assumption for many economic games. For instance, the classic
Bertrand model typically results in nonquasiconcave and discontinuous payoffs. Thus, a general
existence result for nonquasiconcave and discontinuous games is called for. In the following, we
provide an existence result for general nonquasiconcave and discontinuous games. First, recall the
following definition of diagonal transfer quasiconcavity introduced by Baye et al. (1993).
DEFINITION 3.2 A symmetric gameG = (Xi; ui)i2I is said to be diagonally transfer quasicon-
cave if X is convex, and for every player i, any finite subset of fy1; y2; :::; ymg  X , there is a
corresponding finite subset fx1; :::; xmg  X such that for any subset J of f1; :::;mg and every
x 2 cofxj ; j 2 Jg, we have
ui(x; :::; x)  min
k2J
ui(x; :::; x; y
k; x; :::; x):
While diagonal transfer quasiconcavity is weaker than diagonal quasiconcavity,3 and conse-
quently weaker than quasiconcavity, the following notion of diagonal weak transfer continuity is
stronger than the diagonal quasi-weak transfer continuity.
3A game G = (Xi; ui)i2I is said to be diagonally quasiconcave if X is convex, and for every player i, all
x1; :::; xm 2 X and all x 2 cofx1; :::; xmg, ui(x; :::; x)  min
k=1;:::;m
ui(x; :::; x; x
k; x; :::; x):
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DEFINITION 3.3 A symmetric game G = (Xi; ui)i2I is said to be diagonally weak transfer
continuous if whenever (x; :::; x) 2 Xn is not an equilibrium, there exists a player i, strategy
y 2 X ,  > 0, and neighborhood N of x such that ui(z; :::z; y; z; :::; z) > ui(z; :::; z) +  for all
z 2 N .
We now state an existence result for nonquasiconcave and discontinuous games.
THEOREM 3.2 Suppose that G = (Xi; ui)i2I is quasi-symmetric, compact, diagonally transfer
quasiconcave4, and diagonally weak transfer continuous. Then it has a symmetric pure strategy
Nash equilibrium.
As an illustration, we will use the Bertrand model to show the usefulness of Theorem 3.2 in
the following example.
EXAMPLE 3.2 Consider a quasi-symmetric two-player Bertrand price competition game on the
square [0; a] [0; a] with a > 0. Assume that the demand function is discontinuous and is defined
by
Di(pi; p i) =
8>><>>:
f(pi) if pi < p i
f(pi) if pi = p i
f(pi) if pi > p i
where f : R+ ! R+ is a continuous and nonincreasing function and  >  >   0. Suppose
that the total cost of production is zero for each firm. Then, the payoff function for each firm i
becomes
i(pi; p i) =
8>><>>:
pif(pi) if pi < p i
pif(pi) if pi = p i
pif(pi) if pi > p i
:
The game is quasi-symmetric and compact. Since  >  >  and f is nonincreasing, it
is clearly diagonally quasiconcave. Note that the set of discontinuity points is given by A =
f(p1; p2) : p1 = p2g. Let (p; p) be any nonequilibrium strategy. Then obviously there is qi 6= p
so that i(qi; p) > i(p; p) (i.e., (qi; p) =2 A). Choose  > 0 so as i(qi; p) > i(p; p) + 3.
Thus there exists a neighborhood N of p with qi =2 N such that i(qi; p)     i(qi; p0) for all
p0 2 N by the continuity of f . We also have i(p; p) +   i(p0; p0) for all p0 2 N . Therefore,
i(qi; p
0) > i(p0; p0)+ for every p0 2 N . Then, this game is diagonally weak transfer continuous
and by Theorem 3.2, it possesses a symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
4The converse holds as well: if G has a Nash equilibrium, then G is diagonally transfer quasiconcave.
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Similar to the previous section, we can provide some sets of sufficient conditions for diagonal
quasi-weak transfer continuity by introducing various notions of diagonal upper/lower semicon-
tinuity, such as diagonal quasi-weak upper semicontinuity, diagonal quasi upper semicontinuity,
and diagonal weak transfer lower semicontinuity.5
4 Further Extensions and Improvements
We can further improve our main result.
DEFINITION 4.1 A gameG = (Xi; ui)i2I is said to be pseudo quasi-weakly transfer continuous
if whenever x 2 X is not an equilibrium, there exists an  > 0, a neighborhoodN of x, a player
i, and a strategy yi 2 Xi such that for all z 2 N , ui(yi; z i) > ui(zi; z0 i) +  for some z0 2 N .
The difference between pseudo quasi-weak transfer continuity and quasi-weak transfer con-
tinuity is that the former takes the neighborhood Nz equal to Nx so that quasi-weak transfer
continuity implies pseudo quasi-weak transfer continuity.
For each player i 2 I , define a function zi : X Xi ! R by
zi(x; yi) = sup
N2
(x)
inf
z2N

ui(yi; z i)  inf
z02N
ui(zi; z
0
 i)

where 
(x) is the set of all open neighborhoods N of x. We then have the following result.
THEOREM 4.1 Suppose that the game G = (Xi; ui)i2I is compact and pseudo quasi-weakly
transfer continuous. Ifzi is quasiconcave in yi for all i, then the gameG possesses a pure strategy
Nash equilibrium.
The following proposition shows that pseudo quasi-weak transfer continuity is also weaker
than better-reply security, and consequently Theorem 4.1 extends Theorem 3.1 in Reny (1999) by
weakening better-reply security.
PROPOSITION 4.1 If G = (Xi; ui)i2I is better-reply secure, then it is pseudo quasi-weakly
transfer continuous.
While in terms of continuity, Theorem 4.1 is more interesting than Theorem 2.1 as well as Theo-
rem 3.1 in Reny (1999), the quasiconcavity of zi(x; :) is more complicated to check. A question
is then whether quasiconcavity of zi(x; yi) in yi can be replaced by quasiconcavity of ui(xi; x i)
in xi. Unfortunately, the answer is negative.6
5See Nessah and Tian (2009).
6We would like to thank an anonymous referee for Example 4.1.
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EXAMPLE 4.1 Consider, on the unit square, the following game that has no pure strategy Nash
equilibrium.
u1(x) =
(
x1; if x2 = 0
2  x1; otherwise
u2(x) =
(
x2; if x1 = 1
2  x2; otherwise
The considered game is pseudo quasi-weakly transfer continuous and quasiconcave, but in general
the function z1(x; y1) is not quasiconcave in y1. Indeed, for x = (12 ;
1
2),
z1((
1
2
;
1
2
); y1) = max(y1   1
2
;
1
2
  y1)
is not quasiconcave in y1.
Our main result can be further improved by introducing the following notions of transfer quasi-
continuity and strong diagonal transfer quasiconcavity.
DEFINITION 4.2 A game G = (Xi; ui)i2I is said to be weakly transfer quasi-continuous if
whenever x 2 X is not an equilibrium, there exists a y 2 X and a neighborhood Nx of x such
that for every x0 2 Nx, there exists a player i satisfying ui(yi; x0 i) > ui(x0).
Weak transfer quasi-continuity, which was independently introduced in our previously cir-
culated Nessah and Tian (2008) and also called single-deviation property in Reny (2009), only
requires that each strategy profile in a neighborhood of x be upset by one, but not all players.
Thus, it is a very weak notion of continuity so that it is a form of quasi-continuity.
DEFINITION 4.3 A game G = (Xi; ui)i2I is said to be strongly diagonal transfer quasiconcave
if for any finite subset fy1; :::; ymg  X , there exists a corresponding finite subset fx1; :::; xmg 
X such that for any subset fxk1 ; xk2 ; :::; xksg  fxk1 ; xk2 ; :::; xksg, 1  s  m, and any x 2
cofxk1 ; xk2 ; :::; xksg, there exists y 2 fyk1 ; :::; yksg so that
ui(yi; x i)  ui(x) 8i 2 I: (4.1)
It is clear that a game is diagonally transfer quasiconcave if it is strongly diagonal transfer
quasiconcave.7 We then have the following result that generalizes Theorem 2 in Prokopovych
(2013).
THEOREM 4.2 Suppose that a gameG = (Xi; ui)i2I is convex, compact, weakly transfer quasi-
continuous. Then, the game possesses a pure strategy Nash equilibrium if and only if it is strongly
diagonal transfer quasiconcave.
7Indeed, summing up (4.1) and denoting U(x; y) =
P
i2I ui(yi; xi), we have min1ls
U(x; yk
l
)  U(x; x), which
is the condition for diagonal transfer quasiconcavity.
12
It may be remarked that weak transfer quasi-continuity and quasi-weak transfer continuity
are not implied by nor imply each other. The game considered in Example 2.2 is quasi-weakly
transfer continuous, but it does not have the weak single-deviation property which in turn does not
satisfy the single-deviation property/weak transfer quasi-continuity. On the other hand, the game
in Example 3.1 in Reny (2009) is weakly transfer quasi-continuous, but it is not quasi-weakly
transfer continuous.
While weak transfer quasi-continuity in Theorem 4.2 is weaker than the better-reply security
and diagonal transfer continuity, it requires that the game be strongly diagonal transfer quasicon-
cave. Can strong diagonal transfer quasiconcavity in Theorem 4.2 be replaced by conventional
quasiconcavity? Unfortunately, the answer is no. Reny (2009) showed this by giving a counterex-
ample (Example 3.1 in his paper) where a game G = (Xi; ui)i2I is compact, quasiconcave, and
weakly transfer quasi-continuous, but it may not possess a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Thus, Theorems 3.2 and 4.2 both show that there is a trade-off between continuity condition
and quasiconcavity condition.
While Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 are not strict generalization of Theorem 2.1, we now introduce
a result that strictly generalizes Theorem 2.1 in games with discontinuous and nonquasiconcave
payoffs.
For each set B, denote by coB the convex hull of B. Let 
(x) be the set of all open neigh-
borhoods N of x. For each player i 2 I and every (x; yi) 2 X  Xi, define the following
function
	i(x; yi) = sup
N2
(x)
inf
z2N
"
ui(yi; z i)  sup
NzN
inf
z02Nz
ui(zi; z
0
 i)
#
where Nz is a neighborhood of z.
DEFINITION 4.4 A game G = (Xi; ui)i2I is said to be 	-correspondence transfer continuous
if whenever x 2 X is not an equilibrium, there exists an open neighborhood N of x and a well-
behaved correspondence8  : N  X such that for every z 2 N , there exists a player j so
as
zj =2 coftj 2 Xj : 	j(z; tj)  jg;
where j  inf
(x;yj)2Graph(j)
	j(x; yj).
REMARK 4.1 By the same method, we can extend Definitions 3.1, 3.3, and 4.1.
REMARK 4.2 If the game G is quasiconcave, then the condition zj =2 coftj 2 Xj : 	j(z; tj) 
jg becomes 	j(x; yj) > 	j(z; zj), for each (x; yj) 2 Graph(j).
8C is said to be a well-behaved correspondence if it is upper hemicontinuous with nonempty, convex and closed
values and for each x 2 X , C(x) has the following form C(x) = (C1(x); :::; Cn(x)).
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We have the following theorem which is a strict generalization of Theorem 2.1.
THEOREM 4.3 Suppose that G = (Xi; ui)i2I is compact and convex, then G has a pure strategy
Nash equilibrium provided it is 	-correspondence transfer continuous.
REMARK 4.3 The considered game in Example 2.2 is	-correspondence transfer continuous and
consequently by Theorem 4.3 it has a Nash equilibrium.
5 Applications
In this section we show how our main existence results are applied to some important economic
games. We provide two applications: one is the shared resource games that is intensively studied
by Rothstein (2007), and the other is the classic Bertrand price competition games studied first by
Bertrand (1883).
5.1 The Shared Resource Games
The shared resource games that usually result in discontinuous payoffs include a wide class of
games such as the canonical game of fiscal competition for mobile capital. In these games, players
compete for a share of a resource that is in fixed total supply, except perhaps at certain joint
strategies. Each player’s payoff depends on her opponents’ strategies only through the effect those
strategies have on the amount of the shared resource that the player obtains. As Rothstein (2007)
argued, when ad valorem taxes instead of unit taxes are adopted and the aggregate amount of
mobile capital is fixed instead of variable, it will typically result in at least one, and possibly
many, discontinuity points.
Formally, for such a game G = (Xi; ui)i2I , each player i has a convex and compact strategy
spaceXi  Rl and a payoff function ui that depends on other players’ strategies only through the
sharing rule defined by Si : X ! [0; s] with s 2 (0;+1). That is to say, each player has a payoff
function ui : X ! R with the form ui(xi; x i) = Fi[xi; Si(xi; x i)] where Fi : Xi  [0; s]! R
and ui is bounded.9
Let Di  X be the set of joint strategies at which Si is discontinuous and the set  =
S
i2I
Di
be all of the joint strategies at which one or more of the sharing rules are discontinuous. The set
Xn is then all of the joint strategies at which the sharing rules are continuous.
Rothstein (2007) showed a shared resource game possesses a pure strategy Nash equilibrium
if the following conditions are satisfied: (1) X is compact and convex; (2) ui is continuous on
X and quasiconcave in xi; (3) Si satisfies: (3.i)
Pn
i=1 Si(x) = s for all x 2 X n ; (3.ii) there
exists s 2 [0; s] such that Pni=1 Si(x) = s for all x 2 ; (3.iii) for all i, (xi; x i) 2 Di and
9For more details on this model, see Rothstein (2007).
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every neighborhood V(xi) of xi, there exists x0i 2 V(xi) such that (x0i; x i) 2 X n Di; (3.iv)
there exists a constant ~si satisfying s  ~si > s=n such that for all i, all (xi; x i) 2 , and all
(x0i; x i) 2 X n Di, Si(x0i; x i)  ~si  Si(xi; x i); (4) Fi is continuous, nondecreasing in si,
and satisfies max
xi2Xi
Fi(xi; si) > max
xi2Xi
Fi(xi; s=n) for any si > s=n.
In the following, we will give an existence result with much simpler conditions and its proof
is also much easier:
Assumption 1: The game is compact and quasiconcave.
Assumption 2: If (yi; x i) 2 Di and Fi(yi; Si(yi; x i)) > Fi(xi; Si(x)) for player i, then there
exists some player j 2 I and yj such that (yj ; x j) 2 XnDj and Fj(yj ; Sj(yj ; x j)) >
Fj(xj ; Sj(x)).
Assumption 3: If (yi; x i) 2 XnDi and Fi(yi; Si(yi; x i)) > Fi(xi; Si(x)) for player i, then
there exists a player j 2 I , a deviation strategy profile yi,  > 0, and a neighborhood Nx of
x such that for every z 2 Nx and every neighborhoodNz  Nx of z, Fj(yj ; Sj(yj ; z j)) >
Fj(zj ; Sj(zj ; z
0
 j)) +  for some z
0 2 Nz .
Assumption 1 is standard. A well-known sufficient condition for a composite function ui =
Fi[xi; Si(xi; x i)] to be quasiconcave is that Fi is quasiconcave and nondecreasing in si, and
Si is concave. Assumption 2 means that if x is not an equilibrium and can be improved at a
discontinuous strategy profile (yi; x i) when player i uses the deviation strategy yi, then there
exists a player j such that it must also be improved by a continuous strategy profile (yj ; x j)
when player j uses the deviation strategy yj . Assumption 3 means that if a strategy profile x is
not an equilibrium and can be improved by a continuous strategy profile (yi; x i) when player i
uses a deviation strategy yi, then there exists a securing strategy profile y and a neighborhood of
x such that all points in the neighborhood cannot be equilibria. We then have the following result.
PROPOSITION 5.1 A shared resource game possesses a pure strategy Nash equilibrium if it sat-
isfies Assumptions 1-3.
5.2 The Bertrand Price Competition Games
It is well known that Bertrand competition typically results in discontinuous and nonquasiconcave
payoffs. It is a normal form game in which each of n  2 firms, i = 1; 2; :::; n, simultaneously
sets a price pi 2 P = [0; p]. Under the assumption of profit maximization, the payoff to each firm
i is
i(pi; p i) = piDi(pi; p i)  Ci(Di(pi; p i));
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where p i denotes the vector of prices charged by all firms other than i,Di(pi; p i) represents the
total demand for firm i’s product at prices (pi; p i), and Ci(Di(pi; p i)) is firm i’s total cost of
producing the output Di(pi; p i). A Bertrand equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium of this game.
Let Ai  Pn be the set of joint strategies at which i is discontinuous,  =
S
i2I
Ai be the set
of all of the joint strategies at which one or more of the payoffs are discontinuous, and Xn be
the set of all joint strategies at which all of the payoffs are continuous.
We make the following assumptions:
Assumption 10: The game is compact, convex, and quasiconcave.
Assumption 20: If (qi; p i) 2 Ai and i(qi; p i) > i(p) for i 2 I , then there exists a firm j 2 I ,
and qj such that (qj ; p i) 2 PnnAj and j(qj ; p i) > i(p).
Assumption 30: If (qi; p i) 2 PnnAi and i(qi; p i) > i(p) for player i, then there exists a
player j 2 I ,  > 0, a deviation strategy profile qj and a neighborhoodNp of p such that for
every r 2 Np, every neighborhood Nr  Np of r, j(qj ; r i) > j(rj ; r0 j) + , for some
r0 2 Nr.
We then have the following result.
PROPOSITION 5.2 Each Bertrand price competition game has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium
if it satisfies Assumptions 10-30.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate the existence of Nash equilibria in games that may be discontinuous
and/or nonquasiconcave. We offer new existence results on Nash equilibrium for a large class of
discontinuous games by introducing new notions of weak continuity, such as quasi-weak transfer
continuity, pseudo quasi-weak transfer continuity, weak transfer quasi-continuity, etc. Our equi-
librium existence results neither imply nor are implied by those results in Baye et al. (1993), Reny
(1999), Carmona (2009, 2011), and Nessah (2011).
These results permit us to significantly weaken the continuity conditions for the existence of
Nash equilibria. We also provide examples and economic applications where our general results
are applicable. Although some work has been done for seeking necessary and sufficient conditions
for the existence of equilibrium, such as those in Tian (2009), McLennan et al. (2011), and Barelli
and Meneghel (2013), these full characterization results mainly show what is possible for the
existence of equilibrium, yet the conditions are more complicated. As such, they may be harder to
verify.
16
The approach developed in the paper can be similarly used to study the existence of mixed
strategy Nash and Bayesian Nash equilibria in general discontinuous games. For details, see our
earlier version of this paper (cf. Nessah and Tian (2009)).
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Appendix
PROOF OF THEOREM 2.1. The proof of Theorem 2.1 is divided into three steps. In the first step,
we construct for each player i an approximation function 	i(x; yi) defined on X Xi, which is
lower semicontinuous in x. Second step shows that if the game is quasi-weakly transfer continuous
and sup
yi2Xi
	i(x; yi)  0 for each i, then x is a Nash equilibrium. Therefore in the third step, we
need only to find a strategy profile which satisfies the maximum of function 	. For this, based on
function 	, we can construct a correspondence C and show that it is convex valued, x =2 C(x) for
each x 2 X , and C has the lower open section. Then, by Yannelis and Prabhakar Theorem, there
exists x 2 X such that sup
yi2Xi
	i(x; yi)  0.
Step I: Construction. Let 
(x) be the set of all open neighborhoods N of x. For each player
i 2 I and every (x; yi) 2 X Xi, define the following function
	i(x; yi) = sup
N2
(x)
inf
z2N
"
ui(yi; z i)  sup
NzN
inf
z02Nz
ui(zi; z
0
 i)
#
whereNz is a neighborhood of z. For each x 2 X , we have	i(x; xi)  0. Indeed, if	i(x; xi) >
0 for some i 2 I and x 2 X , choose  > 0 with 	i(x; xi) > 2, then there exists a neighborhood
N of x such that for each z = (xi; z i) 2 N , we have ui(xi; z i) > sup
NzN
inf
z02Nz
ui(xi; z
0
 i) +
. Then, for Nz = N , we have ui(xi; z i) > inf
z02N
ui(xi; z
0
 i) +  for each z = (xi; z i) 2
N . Moreover, there exists z 2 N such that ui(xi; z i)  inf
z02N
ui(xi; z
0
 i) +

2 . Therefore,
inf
z02N
ui(xi; z
0
 i) +  < ui(xi; z i)  inf
z02N
ui(xi; z
0
 i) +

2 ; i.e.,  < 0, which is impossible.
For each i and every yi 2 Xi, the function 	i(:; yi) is real-valued by boundedness of payoff
function. Let us consider the following function giN (:; yi) defined by
giN (x; yi) =
8<: infz2N [ui(yi; z i)  supNzN infz02Nzui(zi; z
0
 i)] if x 2 N
 1 if x =2 N
where i 2 I , yi 2 Xi and N is an open neighborhood. The function giN (:; yi) is lower semi-
continuous on X . Since the function 	i(:; yi) is the pointwise supremum of a collection of lower
semicontinuous functions on X , then 	i(:; yi) is lower semicontinuous on X (Lemma 2.41, page
43 in Aliprantis and Border (2006)).
Step II: Detection of Nash Equilibria. If there exists a point x 2 X such that
	i(x; yi)  0; for all i 2 I and yi 2 Xi; (6.1)
then x is a Nash equilibrium. Indeed, if x is not a Nash equilibrium and since the gameG is quasi-
weakly transfer continuous, then there exists a player i, strategy yi,  > 0, and neighborhoodN of
x such that for every z 2 N and every neighborhood Nz  N of z, ui(yi; z i) > ui(zi; z0 i) + 
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for some z0 2 Nz . Then, for each z 2 N , we have ui(yi; z i)   supNzN
inf
z02Nz
ui(zi; z
0
 i) > .
Thus, 	i(x; yi) > , which contradicts (6.1). Therefore, x is a Nash equilibrium.
Step III: Sufficiency for Existence. Define a correspondence C : X  X by C(x) =
Q
i2I
Ci(x)
such that Ci : X  Xi and Ci(x) = fyi 2 Xi : 	i(x; yi) > 0g. For each x 2 X , C(x) is
convex in X . To see this, let x 2 X , y1, y2 be two elements of C(x) and  2 [0; 1]. Since y1 and
y2 are in C(x), then for each i and some  > 0, we have 	i(x; y1i ) > 2 and 	i(x; y
2
i ) > 2. For
 > 0 and j = 1; 2, there exists a neighborhood N j of x such that for all z 2 N j , we have
ui(y
j
i ; z i)  supNzN j
inf
z02Nz
ui(zi; z
0
 i)  	i(x; yji )   > : (6.2)
Let eN = N 1 \ N 2. Suppose sup
Nz eN infz02Nzui(zi; z
0
 i) > sup
NzN j
inf
z02Nz
ui(zi; z
0
 i) for some
z 2 eN . Then, for some  > 0, sup
Nz eN infz02Nzui(zi; z
0
 i) > sup
NzN j
inf
z02Nz
ui(zi; z
0
 i)+2. Therefore,
there exists eNz  eN  N j such that inf
z02 eNzui(zi; z0 i) > infz02Nzui(zi; z0 i) +  for each Nz  N j .
Hence for Nz = eNz  eN  N j , inf
z02 eNzui(zi; z0 i) > infz02 eNzui(zi; z0 i) + , i.e.,  < 0, which is
impossible. Thus, for each z 2 eN and j = 1; 2 we must have
sup
Nz eN infz02Nzui(zi; z
0
 i)  sup
NzN j
inf
z02Nz
ui(zi; z
0
 i): (6.3)
By (6.2) and (6.3), for each j = 1; 2 and each z 2 eN , we have
ui(y
j
i ; z i) > supNzN j
inf
z02Nz
ui(zi; z
0
 i) +   sup
Nz eN infz02Nzui(zi; z
0
 i) + :
Therefore, for each z 2 eN , we have minfui(y1i ; z i); ui(y2i ; z i)g  sup
Nz eN infz02Nzui(zi; z
0
 i) + .
Since the gameG is quasiconcave, thenminfui(y1i ; z i); ui(y2i ; z i)g  ui(y1i +(1 )y2i ; z i)
for all z. Hence, for each z 2 eN , we have ui(y1i +(1  )y2i ; z i)  sup
Nz eN infz02Nzui(zi; z
0
 i)+ ,
i.e., 	i(x; y1i + (1   )y2i ) > 0 and then y1i + (1   )y2i 2 Ci(x) for all i 2 I . Thus,
y1 + (1  )y2 2 C(x).
Since 	i(:; yi) is lower semicontinuous on X , the set fx 2 X : yi 2 Ci(x)g is open in X
for all yi 2 Xi. For each y 2 X , we have C 1(y) = fx 2 X : y 2 C(x)g = fx 2 X : yi 2
Ci(x); 8i 2 Ig =
T
i2I
fx 2 X : yi 2 Ci(x)g =
T
i2I
fx 2 X : 	(x; yi) > 0g. Then C 1(y) is
open in X for every y 2 X . By the convexity of C(x) and 	i(x; xi)  0 for i 2 I and x 2 X , it
follows that x =2 conC(x) = C(x) for each x 2 X . Then, by Yannelis and Prabhakar Theorem
(Yannelis and Prabhakar (1983)), there exists x 2 X such that C(x) = ;. Therefore, for each
i 2 I and each yi 2 Xi, 	i(x; yi)  0, which proves (6.1).
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PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2.1. The conclusion of 2.1.(a) is clearly true. We only need to
show that the conclusions of 2.1.(b) and 2.1.(c) are also true.
2.1.(b) Suppose that G is QWUSC and payoff secure. If x 2 X is not a Nash equilibrium,
then by quasi-weak upper semicontinuity, some player i has a strategy x^i 2 Xi,  > 0 and a
neighborhood N 1 of x such that for every z 2 N 1 and every neighborhood Nz  N 1 of z,
ui(x^i; x i) > ui(zi; z0 i) +  for some z
0 2 Nz . The payoff security of G implies that there exists
a strategy yi and a neighborhood N 2 of x such that ui(yi; z i)  ui(x^i; x i)  2 for all z 2 N 2.
Thus, for every z 2 N = N 1 \N 2 and its neighborhoodNz  N , there exists z0 2 Nz such that
ui(yi; z i) > ui(zi; z0 i) +

2 .
2.1.(c) Suppose that G is WTLSC and QUSC. Then, if x 2 X is not a Nash equilibrium,
by WTLSC, there exists a player i, yi 2 Xi,  > 0 and a neighborhood N 1 of x such that
ui(yi; z i) > ui(x)+  for all z 2 N 1. The QUSC implies that for i 2 I , x 2 X , and  > 0, there
exists a neighborhood N 2 of x such that for every z 2 N 2 and every neighborhood Nz  N 2
of z, ui(x)  ui(zi; z0 i)   2 for some z0 2 Nz . Thus, for every z 2 N = N 1 \ N 2 and its
neighborhood Nz  N , there exists z0 2 Nz such that ui(yi; z i) > ui(zi; z0 i) + 2 .
Thus, by Theorem 2.1, the game possesses a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
PROOF OF THEOREM 3.1. For notational convenience, let i = 1. Define the following
function by, for each (x; y) 2 X X ,
w(x; y) = sup
N2
(x)
inf
fz1;z2gN
"
u1(y; z
1; :::; z1)  sup
N(z1;z2)N
inf
z02N(z1;z2)
u1(z
2; z0; :::; z0)
#
:
We first show that w(x; x)  0 for each x 2 X . Indeed, suppose, by way of contradic-
tion, that w(x; x) > 0 for some x 2 X . Choose  > 0 with w(x; x) > 2. Then there
exists a neighborhood N of x such that for all z1 and z2 in N , we have u1(x; z1; :::; z1) >
sup
N(z1;z2)N
inf
z02N(z1;z2)
u1(z
2; z0; :::; z0) + . Then, for every z 2 N and letting z2 = x, we
have u1(x; z; :::; z) > sup
NzN
inf
z02Nz
u1(x; z
0; :::; z0) + . In particular, taking Nz = N , we
have u1(x; z; :::; z) > inf
z02N
u1(x; z
0; :::; z0) +  for all z 2 N . By definition of inf , for  > 0,
there exists z 2 N such that u1(x; z; :::; z)  inf
z02N
u1(x; z
0; :::; z0) + 2 . Finally, we obtain
inf
z02N
u1(x; z
0; :::; z0) +  < u1(x; z; :::; z)  inf
z02N
u1(x; z
0; :::; z0) + 2 , and consequently, we must
have  < 0, a contradiction.
Also, for each y 2 X , w(:; y) is real-valued and lower semicontinuous on X from the proof
of Theorem 2.1. Thus, H(y) = fx 2 X : w(x; y)  0g is closed in X , i.e., cl H(y) = H(y) for
all y 2 X . Then, G is transfer closed-valued.10
10A correspondence H : X ! 2X is transfer closed-valued on X if for every y 2 X , x 62 H(y) implies that there
exists a point y0 2 X such that x 62 clH(y).
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Moreover, since the game G is quasiconcave, H is transfer FS-convex.11 To show this, sup-
pose by way of contradiction that H is not transfer FS-convex. Then, there exists a finite subset
of fy1; y2; :::; ymg  X , a corresponding finite subset fxl; :::; xmg  X , and a subset J of
f1; :::;mg such that cofxj ; j 2 Jg * S
j2J
H(yj). Thus, there exists x 2 cofxj ; j 2 Jg such that
for each j 2 J , w(x; yj) > 0. Choose  > 0 such that for each j 2 J , w(x; yj) > 2. Then, there
exists a neighborhood N j of x such that for all z1 and z2 in N j , we have
u1(y
j ; z1; :::; z1)  sup
N(z1;z2)N j
inf
z02N(z1;z2)
u1(z
2; z0; :::; z0)  w(x; yj)   > : (6.4)
Let eN = T
j2J
N j . By the same arguments as in the proof of Theorem 2.1, we obtain that for each
z2 2 eN and j 2 J , we have
sup
Nz2 eN infz02N(z1;z2)u1(z
2; z0; :::; z0)  sup
Nz2N j
inf
z02Nz2
u1(z
2; z0; :::; z0): (6.5)
By (6.4) and (6.5), for each (z1; z2) 2 eN and each j 2 J , we have u1(yj ; z1; :::; z1) >
sup
N(z1;z2)N j
inf
z02N(z1;z2)
u1(z
2; z0; :::; z0)+  sup
N(z1;z2) eN infz02N(z1;z2)u1(z
2; z0; :::; z0)+. Therefore,
for each (z1; z2) 2 eN , we havemin
j2J
u1(y
j ; z1; :::; z1)  sup
N(z1;z2) eN infz02N(z1;z2)u1(z
2; z0; :::; z0)+.
Since the gameG is quasiconcave, then u1(x; z1; :::; z1)  sup
N(z1;z2) eN infz02N(z1;z2)u1(z
2; z0; :::z0)+
 for all fz1; z2g 2 eN . Hence,
inf
fz1;z2g2 eN
24u1(x; z1; :::; z1)  sup
N(z1;z2) eN infz02N(z1;z2)u1(z
2; z0; :::; z0)
35  ;
which means that w(x; x) > 0, contradicting to w(x; x)  0 for all x 2 X . Therefore,H must be
transfer FS-convex.
Therefore, by Lemma 1 of Tian (1993),
T
y2X
H(y) is nonempty and compact. Thus, there
exists a point x 2 X such that w(x; y)  0 for all y 2 X . If x is not a symmetric Nash
equilibrium, by diagonal quasi-weak transfer continuity, there exists a player i, say, i = 1, y 2 X ,
 > 0, and a neighborhood N of x such that for every (z1; z2) 2 N and every neighborhood
N(z1;z2)  N of (z1; z2), we have u1(y; z1; :::; z1) > u1(z2; z0; :::; z0)+  for some z0 2 N(z1;z2).
Then, for each (z1; z2) 2 N , u1(y; z1; :::; z1)  sup
N(z1;z2)N
inf
z02N(z1;z2)
u1(z
2; z0; :::; z0) > . Thus,
w(x; y) > , a contradiction. Therefore, x is a Nash equilibrium.
11A correspondence H : X ! 2X is transfer FS-convex if for any finite subset fy1; :::; ymg  X , there exists a
corresponding finite subset fx1; :::; xmg  X such that for each J  f1; :::;mg, we have cofxj ; j 2 Jg  S
j2J
H(yj).
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PROOF OF THEOREM 3.2. Define the following function by, for each (x; y) 2 X X ,
'(x; y) = sup
N2
(x)
inf
z2N
[u1(y; z; :::; z)  u1(z; z; :::; z)] :
For each y 2 X , the function '(:; y) is real-valued and lower semicontinuous over X from the
proof of Theorem 2.1. Thus, K(y) = fx 2 X : '(x; y)  0g is closed in X , and therefore K is
transfer closed-valued.
K is also transfer FS-convex. Suppose not. Then, there exists a finite subset of
fy1; y2; :::; ymg  X , a corresponding finite subset fxl; :::; xmg  X , and a subset J of
f1; :::;mg such that cofxj ; j 2 Jg * S
j2J
K(yj). Thus, there exists x 2 cofxj ; j 2 Jg
such that for each j 2 J , '(x; yj) > 0. Choose  > 0 such that for each j 2 J , '(x; yj) > 2.
Then, there exists a neighborhood N j of x such that for all z in N j , we have
u1(y
j ; z; :::; z)  u1(z; z; :::; z)  '(x; yj)   > : (6.6)
Let z = x 2 N j for each j 2 J . Then (6.6) becomes that
u1(y
j ; x; :::; x)  u1(x; x; :::; x) + ; for each j 2 J: (6.7)
Thenmin
j2J
u1(y
j ; x; :::; x)  u1(x; x; :::; x)+. Since the gameG is diagonally transfer quasicon-
cave, then u1(x; x; :::; x)  u1(x; x; :::; x)+ . Hence,  < 0, which is a contradiction. Therefore,
K must be transfer FS-convex.
Then, by Lemma 1 of Tian (1993),
T
y2X
K(y) is nonempty and compact. Thus, there exists a
point x 2 X such that '(x; y)  0 for all y 2 X . If x is not a symmetric Nash equilibrium, by
diagonal weak transfer continuity, there exists a player i = 1, y 2 X ,  > 0, and a neighborhood
N of x such that ui(y; z; :::; z) > ui(z; z; :::; z) +  for every z 2 N . Thus, '(x; y) > , a
contradiction. Therefore, x is a symmetric Nash equilibrium.
PROOF OF THEOREM 4.1. For each x 2 X , we have zi(x; xi)  0 by the same proof as
in Theorem 2.1. For each i and every xi 2 Xi, the function zi(:; yi) is lower semicontinuous
on X . Consider the following correspondence C : X  X defined by C(x) =
Q
i2I
Ci(x) such
that Ci : X  Xi and Ci(x) = fyi 2 Xi : zi(x; yi) > 0g. Since the function zi(x; :) is
quasiconcave, then C(x) is convex in X . For each x 2 X , by lower semicontinuity of zi(:; yi),
C 1(y) is open in X for each y 2 X . Then, by Yannelis and Prabhakar Theorem, there exists
x 2 X such that C(x) = ;. Therefore, for each i 2 I and each yi 2 Xi, zi(x; yi)  0. If x is not
a Nash equilibrium, then by pseudo quasi-weak transfer continuity, there exists a player i, strategy
yi,  > 0, and a neighborhood N of x such that for each z 2 N , ui(yi; z i) > ui(zi; z0 i) + 
for some z0 2 N . Then, for each z 2 N , we have ui(yi; z i)   inf
z02N
ui(zi; z
0
 i) > , and thus,
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zi(x; yi) > , a contradiction. Therefore, x is a Nash equilibrium.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4.1. Let G = (Xi; ui)i2I be better-reply secure. Suppose, by
way of contradiction, that the game is not pseudo quasi-weakly transfer continuous. Then, there
exists a nonequilibrium x 2 X such that for all player j,  > 0, every neighborhood N of x,
and all yj , there exists x0 2 N satisfying
uj(yj ; x
0
 j)  uj(x0j ; x00 j) + ; for all x00 2 N :
Letting u be the limit of the vector of payoffs corresponding to some sequence of strategies con-
verging to x, and U be the set of all such points, which is a compact set by the boundedness of
payoffs, we have (x; u) 2 cl( ) for all u 2 U. Then, for each (x; u) 2 cl( )with u 2 U, there
exists a player i, a strategy yi,  > 0 and a neighborhood N of x such that ui(yi; x0 i) > ui + 
for all x0 2 N . Then inf
x02N
ui(yi; x
0
 i)  ui + . Let Ui be the projection of U to coordinate i
and
ui = supfui 2 Ui : inf
x02N
ui(yi; x
0
 i)  ui + g:
Then, for =2 > 0, there is a neighborhood N i; of x and a strategy yi such that
inf
x02N i;
ui(y

i ; x
0
 i)  (ui + )  =2 = ui + =2: (6.8)
Now, since the game is not pseudo quasi-weakly transfer continuous, then for a directed system
of neighborhoods fN kgk of x, a sequence fkgk converging to 0, and every j 2 I , there exists a
sequence fxj;kgk with xj;k 2 N k so that fxj;kgk converges to x and
uj(y

j ; x
j;k
 j)  uj(xj;kj ; x0 j) + k; for each x0 2 N k: (6.9)
Consider the following sequence: for each k, let exk = (x1;k1 ; :::; xn;kn ). Since for each j 2 I ,
xj;k 2 N k and fxj;kgk converges to x, then exk 2 N k and the sequence fexkgk converges to x.
Therefore, inequality (6.9) becomes
uj(y

j ; x
j;k
 j)  uj(xj;kj ; exk j) = uj(exk) + k; for each k; j 2 I: (6.10)
Assume that fu(exk)gk converges and eu = lim
k!1
u(exk). Hence, (x; eu) 2 cl( ) with eu 2 U, then
there exists a player i 2 I such that eui  ui . Thus, for =3 > 0, there exists k1 such that whenever
k > k1, we have ui(yi ; x
i;k
 i)  ui + =3  inf
x02N i;
ui(y

i ; x
0
 i)  =6. Then for k > k1, we obtain
ui(y

i ; x
i;k
 i)  ui(yi ; x0 i)  =6; for each x0 2 N i;: (6.11)
Since the sequence fxi;kgk converges to x, then forN i;, there exists k2 such that for k > k2, we
have xi;k 2 N i;. Thus, by (6.11) for k > max(k1; k2), we have ui(yi ; xi;k i)  ui(yi ; xi;k i) =6,
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which is impossible. Hence, the game must be pseudo quasi-weakly transfer continuous.
PROOF OF THEOREM 4.2. Sufficiency. For each y 2 X , let
F (y) = fx 2 X : ui(yi; x i)  ui(x); 8i 2 Ig:
It is clear that G is weakly transfer quasi-continuous if and only if F is transfer closed-valued.
For y 2 X , let F (y) = cl F (y). Then F (y) is closed, and by the strong diagonal trans-
fer quasiconcavity, it is also transfer FS-convex. By Lemma 1 in Tian (1993), we know thatT
y2X
F (y) =
T
y2X
F (y) 6= ;. Thus, there exists a strategy profile x 2 X such that
ui(yi; x i)  ui(x); for all y 2 X and i 2 I:
Thus x is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the game G.
Necessity: Suppose the game   has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium x 2 X . We want
to show that it is strongly diagonal transfer quasiconcave in y. Indeed, for any finite subset
fy1; : : : ; ymg  X , let the corresponding finite subset Xm = fx1; : : : ; xmg = fxg. Then for
any subset fxk1 ; xk2 ; : : : ; xksg  Xm = fxg, 1  s  m, x 2 co fxk1 ; xk2 ; : : : ; xksg = fxg,
and y 2 fyk1 ; yk2 ; : : : ; yksg, we have
ui(yi; x i) = ui(yi; x i)  ui(xi ; x i) = ui(xi; x i):
Hence U is strongly diagonal transfer quasiconcave in x.
PROOF OF THEOREM 4.3. Define a surrogate game G0 = ( ~Xi; ~ui)i2I0 as follows: I0 =
I[f0g, ~Xi = X if i = 0 and ~Xi = Xi if i 2 I , and ~ui : ~X = XX ! R by ~ui(x; y) = 	i(x; yi)
if i 2 I and ~u0(x; y) =
(
1 if x = y;
0 otherwise.
We first show that G has a Nash equilibrium if G0 has an equilibrium. Indeed, let (x; y) be
a Nash equilibrium of surrogate game G0. Then, by definition of the payoff ~u0, we must have
x = y, otherwise it cannot be a Nash equilibrium. Then it is clear that x is a Nash equilibrium of
G.
Now we show that the surrogate gameG0 has an equilibrium. Fix any nonequilibrium strategy
~x = (x; y) of G0. Then we need distinguish two cases.
Case 1) x 6= y. Then choose a neighborhood V(x;y)  XX such that for each (z1; z2) 2 V(x;y)
with z1 6= z2 and a well-behaved correspondence 0 : V(x;y)  X defined by 0(z1; z2) =
fz1g, we have ~u0(z1; z1) = 1 > 0 = ~u0(z1; z2), for each (z1; z2) 2 V(x;y).
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Case 2) x = y. Then, by the 	-correspondence transfer continuity of G, the surrogate game G0
is continuously secure in (x; x)12 (see Barelli and Meneghel (2013)).
Thus, in either case, the surrogate gameG0 is continuously secure, and consequently, by Theorem
2.2 of Barelli and Meneghel (2013), it has a Nash equilibrium (x; x), which implies that x is a
Nash equilibrium of G.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5.1. Suppose x is not an equilibrium. Then some player i
has a strategy yi such that ui(yi; x i) > ui(x), i.e., Fi(yi; Si(yi; x i)) > Fi(xi; Si(x)). If
(yi; x i) 2 XnDi, then by Assumption 3, there exists a player j 2 I , a deviation strategy
profile y,  > 0, and a neighborhood V(x) of x such that for every z 2 V(x) and ev-
ery neighborhood Nz  Nx of z, Fj(yj ; Sj(yj ; z j)) > Fj(zj ; Sj(zj ; z0 j)) +  for some
z0 2 Nz , i.e., uj(y0j ; z j) > uj(zj ; z0 j) +  for some z0 2 Nz . If (yi; x i) 2 Di, then
by Assumption 2, there exists a player j 2 I and yj such that (yj ; x j) 2 XnDj and
Fj(yj ; Sj(yj ; x j)) > Fj(xj ; Sj(x)). Thus, by Assumption 3, there exists a player k 2 I , a
deviation strategy profile ~y,  > 0, and a neighborhood V(x) of x such that for every z 2 V(x)
and every neighborhood Nz  Nx of z, Fk(~yk; Sk(~yk; z k)) > Fj(zk; Sk(zk; z0 k)) +  for some
z0 2 Nz , i.e., uk(~yk; z k) > uk(zk; z0 k) for some z0 2 Nz . Therefore, the game is quasi-weakly
transfer continuous. Since it is also compact and quasiconcave, by Theorem 2.1, it has a pure
strategy Nash equilibrium.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5.2. Suppose p is not an equilibrium. Then some player i has
a strategy qi such that i(qi; p i) > i(p). If (qi; p i) 2 PnnAi, then by Assumption 3’, there
exists a player j 2 I , a deviation strategy profile qj and a neighborhood Np of p such that for
every r 2 Np, every neighborhood Nr  Np of r, j(qj ; r i) > j(rj ; r0 j) + , for some
r0 2 Nr. If (qi; p i) 2 Ai, then by Assumption 2’, there exists a firm j 2 I , and qj such
that (qj ; p i) 2 PnnAj and j(qj ; p i) > i(p). Thus, by Assumption 3, there exists a player
j 2 I , a deviation strategy profile qj and a neighborhoodNp of p such that for every r 2 Np, every
neighborhoodNr  Np of r, j(qj ; r i) > j(rj ; r0 j)+, for some r0 2 Nr. Therefore, the game
is quasi-weakly transfer continuous. Since the game is also compact, convex, and quasiconcave,
by Theorem 2.1, it has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
12G = (Xi; ui)i2I is continuously secure at x where x is not an equilibrium. Then there is a neighborhoodN of x,
 2 Rn, and a well-behaved correspondence x : N  X so that
(1) for each t 2 N and i 2 I , we have x;i(t)  Bi(t; i),
(2) for each z 2 N , there exists a player j for whom zj =2 coBj(z; j),
where Bi(x; i) = fyi 2 Xi such that ui(yi; x i)  ig.
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